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The Planned Transformation: 
A Closer Look at the 
Chicago Housing Authority
     T’Chana Bradford
Chicago is considered the cultural and economic hub of  the Midwest because of  its large population 
and rich culture. While the city’s population of  more than 2.8 million is about one third black, one 
third white, and one third “hispanic,” it nevertheless ranks 83 on the scale of  segregation (Chicago 
Area Fair Housing Alliance, 2001).1
If  Chicago is such an economically successful and culturally diverse metropolis, one might ask how 
such intense segregation could exist. While there are many factors contributing to the existence 
and persistence of  segregation in the City of  Chicago, a partial response to this question can be 
found in the history of  the Chicago housing project. Originally intended as transitional housing for 
predominantly white families thrown off  track by the early periods of  economic depression, the 
projects have evolved into permanent “vertical ghettos” that virtually imprison their inhabitants—
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
began to question the merit of  the public housing system in Chicago, and they came to the realization 
that it serves as merely a medium through which African Americans are ostracized from society and 
forced to remain in impoverished conditions. 
In the early 1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the federal government (through the 
Plan for Transformation and the Hope VI program, respectively) initiated a proactive campaign to rid 
the city of  the monstrous public housing towers in the name of  creating more viable, mixed-income 
communities. While the CHA has already demolished a great majority of  the towers and is well into 
the middle stages of  its attempt at urban revitalization, there are still major loopholes in the initiative. 
The most critical issue is that of  placement of  former high-rise tenants. What will become of  the 
thousands of  residents who were forced to leave the projects all at once? How will these abrupt 
changes contribute to the mitigation (or perpetuation) of  segregation? What is the impact of  these 
revitalization attempts on Chicago’s future? This paper attempts to analyze the initiatives of  the CHA 
in urban revitalization and its implications for the future of  housing and segregation in both Chicago 
and its metropolitan area. A brief  introduction of  the history of  the public housing system in Chicago 
1   The scale ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing extreme segregation.
In the early 1990s, the Chicago Housing Authority began a wide-scale initiative to overhaul its 
public housing system by demolishing some of  its most notorious high-rise towers to replace 
them with new mixed-income housing developments. This effort was a means of  encouraging 
integration in some of  the city’s many segregated communities. The initiative, called the Plan 
to Transformation, was a highly controversial issue, and raised numerous concerns regarding 
residents of  the high-rise towers. This paper attempts to analyze the initiatives of  the Plan to 
Transformation and its implications for the future of  housing and segregation in Chicago and 
its metro area. 
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will be given, along with a detailed description of  the change in perspectives about public housing. 
Next, the plan’s impact on African Americans and housing will be assessed, along with current 
successes (or failures) of  the program. Last, closing remarks about the initiatives will be given and 
areas for improvement will be considered.
Chicago public housing was formed after the Great Depression under the Housing Act of  1937 as a 
source of  transition for middle-class families caught in the economic disaster (Atlas and Dreier 1994). 
Initially intended for whites, public housing was built in white neighborhoods and soon became the 
most desired form of  housing, envied by all, including residents of  private housing. Public housing 
was such a success because of  the leadership and management of  Elizabeth Wood, then Executive 
Director of  the CHA (Fuerst 2003).2 Public housing had become popular, and everyone wanted to 
jump on the bandwagon for a better quality of  life. This fascination with public housing had not 
become a problem until African Americans became part of  the dream. Following the Second World 
War, there was an increased demand for housing to accommodate the enclaves of  African Americans 
??????????????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????
because African Americans began to integrate previously all-white neighborhoods, much to the 
dismay and discontent of  whites.3
Despite the violent response of  white city residents at large, the CHA managed to continue the 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
intervened and started denying the CHA permission to build in white areas. In turn, the Authority was 
required to build all its public housing in black neighborhoods.  
While the demographics of  the City’s core experienced a drastic change, the Housing Authority’s 
representation endured a similar change. Over the course of  two decades, Wood and her Board of  
Directors resigned, and a new Board of  Directors took over. The new administration continued to 
build new high-rises, but the existing ones were no longer maintained under the new leadership. Rules 
were no longer enforced, the excuse being that no federal funds were available for upkeep of  the 
properties (Fuerst 2003).
Consequently, people who had the capacity to do so left the projects and migrated toward the suburbs 
or to private landlords in other places in the City (Atlas and Dreier 1994). The exodus of  working 
class families, in conjunction with the Housing Act of  1949 which established that the poverty-
stricken should be the recipients of  public housing, contributed to the demise of  public housing 
projects.  With the lower-middle class gone, there was no longer an incentive for property managers to 
maintain the units, which became centers of  decay and, soon, sources of  violence and illegal activity. 
In 1995, however, there was a sudden interest in improving the conditions of  the ghettos in which 
these monstrous towers existed. The public housing projects under the management of  the CHA had 
2   Elizabeth Wood was the Executive Director of  the Chicago Housing Authority for almost two decades. Under Wood, the 
staff  of  the Authority as well as public housing residents had to meet requirements.  Tenants of  public housing in Chicago were
???????????????? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
parents worked.
3   Allan Spear, in Hirsch (1983), describes the conditions of  public housing, mentioning that prior to World War II racial barriers
had been “successfully defended,” but soon thereafter “the number of  technically ‘mixed’ census tracts increased from 135 to 204
between 1940 and 1950,” and only 160 of  the city’s 935 census tracts were without a single nonwhite resident in 1950, compared 
with only 350 such tracts just ten years earlier” (Hirsch 1983, 5).
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??????????????????????????? ???????????? ? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
properties in that same year. HUD management would continue until the Authority could prove itself  
capable of  effectively managing its housing again (Socialist Worker Online 2002). Not long before the 
takeover, HUD established the Hope VI program to help revitalize distressed public housing.
??????????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the authority to demolish buildings whose rehabilitation costs would exceed costs of  complete 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
give displaced families Section 8 vouchers (now called “Housing Choice” vouchers) to subsidize their 
move to housing markets in the private sector. According to the results from the test, a total of  51 
buildings of  high-rise housing—18,500 units—throughout the City were considered damaged beyond 
the government’s ability to repair them (Whitman and McCoy 2000). The demolition began quickly, 
and in the midst of  the chaotic frenzy of  the wrecking ball, Chicago was able to regain its control 
over the Housing Authority. In 2000, the Housing Authority, backed by HUD and supported by 
Mayor Richard M. Daley, established the Plan for Transformation, which included a $1.5 billion plan 
to create mixed income neighborhoods in place of  demolished high-rises over a period of  ten years 
(Paulson 2003). A description of  the future mixed-income housing communities is noted in Paulson 
(2003):
The vision is a grand one: new mixed-income neighborhoods replacing old high-rises. 
Homeowners living in town houses alongside public housing and affordable-housing 
tenants. A plethora of  shops and diversions in now deserted areas. In the process, every 
resident will be relocated at least once, to transitional public housing or to the private 
market. 
Although in theory these new mixed-income communities seem like ideal places to live, some are 
unmoved by the plan, and the general question among those who voice concern is: what happens to 
all of  the tenants who are forced to leave the buildings? What makes this question even more valid is the 
Gautreaux decision of  1969. In this case, Dorothy Gautreaux and a group of  public housing residents 
??????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
Americans by placing nearly all public housing in all black neighborhoods. The plaintiffs were angry 
with HUD because they believed that although it was in a position to counter the actions of  the 
CHA by withdrawing funding, it failed to do so and was thus promoting discrimination against these 
groups. The result of  Gautreaux was the three-for-one rule. Under this rule, CHA was mandated 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
neighborhoods containing a population more than 30 percent black. Later, three-for-one was changed 
to one-for-one (see Oldweiler and Rogal). When Congress introduced the viability test in 1996, the 
previously established one-for-one replacement rule was suspended. This suspension could have huge 
impacts on the future of  public housing residents. Without the existence of  the one-for-one rule, the 
CHA could virtually wipe out all of  the public housing units and would not be obligated to build any 
more to accommodate those low-income residents who were forced out.
Currently, the CHA is in the middle stages of  the Plan for Transformation, and, by the end of  the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
25,000 units (Chicago Housing Authority 2003). At the time the Plan was being made, the CHA 
counted 6,100 units that would be redeveloped for mixed-income families, 9,500 units that would be 
rehabilitated and reserved for senior housing, and another 9,400 that would be “either reconstructed 
or rehabbed” (2003). Under the Plan, The Housing Authority intends to build one-third public 
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housing, one-third affordable housing, and one-third market-rate housing, all within the same 
complexes.
The CHA emphasizes “choice” in the Plan for Transformation. The CHA has prepared Relocation 
Rights Contracts for its tenants—one for those who lived in public housing before October 1, 1999 
and one for those who came to the Housing Authority units after that date. The contracts inform 
tenants of  their options for housing under the Plan. Lease-compliant tenants who lived in any of  
the public housing units prior to October 1, 1999 will receive “priority” in their choice. In their 
contracts, they have (1) a right to temporary housing, in which they will be able to live for one to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
newly rehabilitated housing. It is necessary to note, however, that a disclaimer in the contract reads: 
“Preference to return to public housing = You can choose to come back to public housing, but there is no guarantee that 
public housing will be available for you” (Chicago Housing Authority 2003).
Rules for tenants that moved into the Chicago public housing projects after October 1, 1999 are 
somewhat similar. These tenants have (1) a right to Section 8 housing as a permanent alternative to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of  their choice, or (2) a “right to a preference to come back to public housing.” However, this second 
choice would be second in priority to those in the pre-October 1st cohort—only after they choose 
that they would not prefer to stay with public housing would priority be opened to those in the 
post-October 1st cohort (Chicago Housing Authority 2003). In both cases, tenants must be lease-
compliant, and both cohorts of  tenants will have the right to transitional services that would help 
them move, although, according to some critics, the services came too late (Rogal 2005).
According to a study conducted by Venkatesh and Celimli (2004), approximately 75 percent of  CHA 
families would prefer to return to their old neighborhood. However, as the Relocation Rights Contract 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?
things. Furthermore, the rules and regulations with which tenants must comply before they are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
a tenant who has a utility balance with the Authority, (2) one who is not current in rent, and/or (3) a 
tenant who exercises bad “housekeeping.” According to Venkatesh and Celimli, this means that less 
than 20 percent of  the public housing tenants expressing interest in returning would be able to do so.
While the Plan’s contracts seem rather inconsistent with realities in that there is really no “choice” 
for a majority of  people, the Plan also has a negative impact on those tenants who actually would 
prefer to move to the private sector.  While the CHA is informing tenants that they will have the 
right to temporary and/or permanent housing through Section 8 vouchers, the numbers of  vouchers 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
housing. As of  2003, the number of  families in line for Section 8 vouchers was documented at 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ????????
housing agencies that provide Section 8 vouchers stated that their lists were closed, and they would 
not be opening them for the rest of  that year (Rynell 2003). The CHA’s waitlist is among those that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
promising as its proponents would like to believe.
According to Laurene Heybach of  the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, “more than 260 families 
(a total of  800 people) were displaced from the proceedings of  the Plan for Transformation and 
sought homeless shelter” (Heybach 2005). That number does not include the scores of  former 
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tenants who had to move back with family members or friends in order to avoid being placed in 
the streets. One former CHA resident even crossed the line when she and her family moved into a 
vacant apartment in the Robert Taylor homes on Chicago’s south side without permission. When the 
police found out, they arrested the tenant and the family and friends that had also set up shop in the 
apartment. When asked about the ordeal, the tenant said that she had to do what was necessary to 
avoid the streets (Rogal 2000). As a result of  the mass destruction of  the public housing buildings, it 
is apparent that there is a mismatch between the availability of  housing and the needs of  displaced 
low-income families—there is simply not enough housing to accommodate the displaced.
Although a great majority of  original public housing tenants are on waiting lists for Section 8 
vouchers, some residents have been successful in obtaining the vouchers and are able to look for 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
addition to the high rents charged in Chicago, some Section 8 tenants are met with opposition and 
hostility from neighbors and landlords (Thigpen 2002). Thigpen notes that the Lawyers’ Committee 
for Better Housing reported that “nearly 75 percent of  the city’s landlords illegally refuse or rebuff  
apartment-seeking tenants who present housing vouchers” (Thigpen 2002, 3). Those who are able 
to overlook the disdainful glares of  neighbors and the condescending speech of  the landlords have 
managed to tackle a major obstacle. Sometimes landlords of  Section 8 tenants may not even provide 
regular maintenance and upkeep to those apartments in a timely manner. The experience one woman 
had with a Section 8 landlord was described by Thigpen: “[The] landlord, she recalls, discouraged her 
from complaining about rats, telling her, ‘You’re from Cabrini [Green]; you should be used to rats’” 
????????????????? ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
While it is not always the case that former public housing tenants are forced to relocate to 
neighborhoods with less than mediocre buildings, it is not uncommon for these tenants to relocate to 
the same types of  areas from which they moved, primarily because their low incomes limit the extent 
to which they can really choose where they would like to live. In order to qualify for Section 8, a one-
person household must earn no more than $20,850, and a four-person household must earn no more 
than $29,750 (Rogal 1998). Under the Section 8 program, low-income families would be required to 
pay only the amount of  rent equivalent to 30 percent of  their income, with the remainder subsidized 
by the federal government.
With such low incomes, most of  the time former public housing tenants are led to low-income, black 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
CHA families are at least 97 percent black and have per capita incomes of  only $10,000 (Rogal 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
Lake Forrest College that looked at 1,000 public housing families and their relocation patterns. The 
study showed that “almost 80 percent of  relocation families are living in census tracts that are over 
90 percent black, and over 90 percent are in census tracts that are under $15,000 median income.” 
(Socialist Worker Online 2002). This re-concentration of  low-income public housing tenants in 
neighborhoods similar to the ones they were so quickly forced to leave raises the question: why were 
??????????????????????????????????????? Allowing former tenants to re-concentrate in that manner defeats the 
purposes of  Gautreaux and the three-for-one rule, or its one-for-one replacement, as well as the goals 
of  the Plan for Transformation to create “mixed income communities.” If  the CHA is adamant about 
suddenly forcing these tenants out of  the substandard public housing that existed for decades in order 
to “revitalize” the area, why would it allow tenants to jump right back into that hole of  poverty? The 
intent of  the CHA then becomes questionable.  Toward what group or groups is the revitalization 
Plan truly aimed?
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
people around—or rather, out of  the way—so that middle-class whites can return to the center, 
where their downtown jobs and entertainment sources are a quick train ride away. Venkatesh (1997) 
comments on the revitalization initiatives of  HUD by writing: 
HUD likes to tout Chicago as a model for public housing reconversion in the 
rest of  the country. But in the current environment, what assurance is there that 
the displaced tenants will be taken care of? Subsidies for low-income housing are 
being cut back. At this writing, the 1997 housing bill, calling for the demolition and 
dilution of  public housing projects, has passed the House and is awaiting action in 
the Senate. The bill would remove large numbers of  very poor people from public 
housing without providing for alternatives. Essentially, it ‘solves’ the public housing 
problem by evicting many tenants and importing a better class of  poor people.
As reported in Claiborne (1999), Rich Wheelock, another critic of  the CHA’s Plan for Transformation 
and a Legal Assistance Foundation Cabrini-Green tenants’ lawyer, suggested that in executing 
this Plan, the Authority is not really addressing the needs of  the people; rather it is acting on the 
opportunity to seize “prime real estate on the western edge of  the downtown residential and 
commercial” districts and adorn it with condominiums for “higher-income residents.”
As if  to reinforce the doubts of  skeptics, in February of  2005, newly developed apartments all over 
the city had gone un-touched, awaiting public housing residents for months after their completion. 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
on previous court cases such as Gautreaux that encourage mixed-income communities, and the 
one-for-one rule, although that rule had been suspended well before 2005. One redeveloped site, 
in particular—Lake Park Crescent, along the Lake Michigan waterfront on Chicago’s east side—is 
struggling to meet the requirements of  the courts regarding the income distribution of  prospective 
residents. As of  February 2006, the court required that one-half  of  the public housing units at this 
development contain families that earn between 50 and 80 percent of  the median income. Another 
rule enforced by federal tax regulations prohibits the Authority from giving apartments to those 
families earning more than 60 percent of  the area’s media income— $63,800 for a family of  four 
(Olivo 2005). According to Gail Niemann, general counsel of  the CHA, “That ends up being a very 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
On a more optimistic note, however, some CHA revitalization efforts have been successfully carried 
out, and some are currently underway. North Town Village, which is the redevelopment of  the former 
Cabrini-Green site, located at a prime location in Chicago’s west side close to the loop, has already 
?????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
quite expensive prices (Grossman and Lawrence 2001). About half  of  the units at this site are being 
sold or rented at market rate. Another site in process of  becoming a mixed-income community is 
the Shakespeare Townhomes in North Kenwood, a neighborhood on Chicago’s southeast side, close 
to Lake Michigan. These homes, like those at North Town Village, are selling at competitive market 
prices (63% of  the homes have been sold at market rate). 
While some apartments and homes at the redeveloped sites have been bought out, some people in 
their vicinity still have doubts. A contributing editor of  Newsweek magazine states, “I don’t think 
the objection is as crass as ‘we don’t want poor people here,’ or ‘we hate people from the projects.’ 
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It’s about whether my property values are going to hold, whether my kids are going to go to a decent 
school, whether my wife is going to be able to walk the streets.’” (Grossman and Lawrence 2001). 
Likewise, former public housing tenants are concerned about how they will fare in the new residences. 
For example, Rhonda White, a former tenant, feels “incarcerated” and “‘would rather live someplace 
[she feels] comfortable’” (Grossman and Lawrence 2001).
There is no doubt that creating mixed-income communities in the midst of  a city in which segregation 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????????????
value—that is, if  the CHA promoted the mere implementation of  mixed income neighborhoods, 
neglecting to provide any additional transitional services to its former public housing residents—the 
initiatives would surely fail. Rosenbaum and colleagues prove this concept in their discussion of  the 
geography of  opportunity, which demonstrates that low-income individuals are better off  in mixed 
income neighborhoods that provided access to services and other resources that serve as platforms 
to help them gain stability in the socio-economic realm (Rosenbaum 2002). This existence in mixed-
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
increased motivation for the individual to succeed. Thus, the immediate and continued provision of  
strong support programs and services for former public housing tenants in the new mixed-income 
communities is an essential component of  the program. Although it took longer than it should 
have, the CHA is now very active in providing services for former public housing tenants, and CHA 
authorities understand the weight of  this factor in creating successful mixed-income communities. 
The CHA’s revitalization of  its properties for the creation of  mixed-income communities, with the 
provision of  social support services to those public housing residents moving into these communities, 
is an impressive step toward the social and economic restructuring of  the city. However, the problem 
that arises concerns the process of  this restructuring. In creating these mixed-income communities, 
the Authority had to demolish more than half  of  its units in which thousands of  tenants resided. The 
Authority was somewhat remiss in carrying out this portion of  its plan. A total of  14,000 units will 
be lost during this transformation process, and the CHA was not well prepared to handle the “what-
??????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
redevelop more units, but the funds simply are not there because the government will not pay for 
it. This revitalization closely resembles the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe in that the poorest of  the 
poor were left out of  the plan. This concept is quite disconcerting, considering that HUD was the 
organization that initially and so frantically wanted to intervene in this “crisis.” Now, when the time to 
act has come, there are no funds available.
In order to amend this situation, the City of  Chicago, as well as HUD, must quickly create funds 
for affordable housing in mixed-income, mixed-race communities for the tenants it displaced. One 
potential method for raising such funds is the imposition of  a developer fee or dedication requirement 
for developers who want to build in or around the former public housing sites. Developers that 
choose to incorporate affordable housing into their sites could be rewarded with density bonuses. 
The Balanced Development Coalition of  Chicago is pushing for such inclusionary zoning methods. 
Another potential method is to provide property tax incentives to landlords with well-maintained 
affordable housing, while giving tax penalties to those with poorly maintained units. (Nyden 2003). A 
traditional method for ensuring that the stock of  low-income housing is not clustered in one area of  
the city is to update current zoning to include a variety of  uses—multi-family with single-family, retail, 
and commercial.
While some of  the above methods may spark controversy among NIMBYists and even political 
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?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
residents are living in conditions similar to the ones they left when the intent was to create better 
opportunities and conditions for them. By creating relatively few spaces for public housing residents, the 
CHA may pacify some supporters of  public housing and protect itself  from major lawsuits. But if  these 
tenants are simply left in similar low-income communities in the suburbs or in areas further away from 
????????????????????????????????? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Looking back on the past mistakes the City has made in public housing decisions, this revitalization 
??????? ?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
struggling with the problems of  segregation and concentrated poverty across the country. However, in 
solving these problems, authorities must be careful to include every detail of  the situation—its origins, 
processes, potential weaknesses, and impacts on future generations.  Mayor Daley, in his Inaugural 
Address of  1999, strengthened this idea: 
We have challenged the old ways of  thinking and fashioned new ways of  solving 
problems…and today, Chicago is moving forward on many fronts. But there is always 
more to be done. We can’t claim victory until every community is liberated…and we 
can’t claim victory until every neighborhood enjoys a good quality of  life.
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